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Introduction
The origin of the Colombian oil industry
dates back to 1905, when the first concession
contract was granted to Roberto De Mares. At
the time, the Colombian government had no
experience regulating oil production and imple-
mented the concession contract system that was
already established in oil-rich nations, like
Iran and Russia. This contract system allowed
the holder of the concession the freedom to
extract underground hydrocarbons, such as oil,
from a designated plot of land in exchange for
royalty payments to the government. Political
and economic conditions later led to the imple-
mentation of the association contract system in
1974 and the ensuing establishment of
Ecopetrol as the national oil company. The new
association contract system mandated that all
oil speculators finance the cost of upfront explo-
ration and were legally obligated to share prof-
its with Ecopetrol, now representing the 
government.
However, by 2003, the Colombian oil
industry was on the verge of collapse. Foreign
companies were not interested in partnering
with a national oil company if they undertook
all the risk yet still had to share profits. Further-
more, rising public debt and increasing guerilla
attacks created an extremely unstable invest-
ment climate in Colombia. The result was a
flight of foreign direct investment that provided
the impetus for a dramatic drop in produc-
tion. Colombian oil output fell to 541,000 bar-
rels per day (bpd) in 2003 after producing well
over 800,000 bpd just four years earlier (Echev-
erry et al., p. 5).
Today, oil accounts for over 50 percent of
Colombia’s exports (“Colombia’s New Oil . . .”)
and is pushing Colombia to become a legiti-
mate supplier in the world economy. This arti-
cle provides an analysis of Colombian oil pol-
icy under the concession contract system
(1905–1974) and the association contract system
(1974–2003), with an emphasis on the modern
exploration and production contract (E&P)
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(2003–present) that is driving the Colombian oil
resurgence. It is most useful to assess policy
implications through the lens of three enti-
ties: the Colombian oil sector, Ecopetrol, and
the Colombian government.
1905–1974: Concession Contracts
Pre-1951
Rooted deep in the history of Colombia
is the concept of subsoil ownership, a residual
effect of Spanish colonial rule (Bell, p. 133).
Defined more clearly in Article 332 of Colom-
bia’s current constitution, the state owns the
rights to all subsoil and its economic benefits
(Colombian Constitution). This gave the Colom-
bian government the ability to grant exclusive
production rights for a given parcel of land in
exchange for royalties based on the oil extracted
beneath the land—a concept that both defined
and justified the original concession contracts
in the early twentieth century. Royalties on
these contracts ranged from 6 to 15 percent, and
the contract length could range anywhere from
23 to 50 years, after which the concession, land,
and all other assets relating to the concession
revert back to the government (Segovia, p. 3). 
Prior to 1951, two concession contracts
granted in 1905 shaped the industry: the De
Mares concession and the Barco concession.
Together, they accounted for all hydrocarbon
production from 1921 to 1941 (Santiago, p. 22).
However, both faced significant resistance from
the government after initially receiving the con-
tract. Colonel De Mares sought to sell his con-
cession to the Tropical Oil Company in 1919
as the concession appreciated significantly in
value almost 15 years after De Mares origi-
nally purchased it from the government. Prior
to approving the sale to Tropical Oil, the gov-
ernment mandated that the concession land
be reduced by 80 percent, royalties be paid at 10
percent of gross oil rather than 15 percent of
refined oil, and an oil refinery constructed at
Barrancabermeja (Durán). The Barco conces-
sion was taken away in 1926 for “noncompli-
ance,” nine years after being purchased by
Gulf Oil, as oil production had yet to begin
and the government could not collect royal-
ties on a nonproducing well (Durán). The con-
cession was eventually reauthorized in 1931 but
only if Gulf agreed to pay a 6 percent royalty
to the government and build a 263-mile pipeline
to the northern coast port of Coveñas (Durán). 
The exorbitant demands levied on both
concessions highlight an important catalyst of
early oil policy: the advancement of political
objectives over oil industry growth. Colonel
De Mares’ attempted partnership with Tropical
Oil (an American company) came at a time
when the Colombian government was still furi-
ous with the United States for its role in the
secession of Panama (1903) and ensuing canal
construction (1914). Colombians wanted to
ensure the United States could not take advan-
tage of them again, as evidenced by the gov-
ernment’s resistance to partnerships with Amer-
ican companies sought by the De Mares and
Barco concession owners. The seizure and
subsequent reauthorization of the Barco con-
cession in 1926 was a way for the government
to assert its presence on fields already in 
production. Furthermore, the mandated con-
struction of both the Coveñas pipeline and Bar-
rancabermeja refinery created assets the gov-
ernment would need to operate the oil
production process when the concessions
expired and reverted back to the government.
Despite the strained relationship between
the government and the oil sector, the indus-
try continued to grow. Shortly after purchas-
ing the De Mares concession, Tropical Oil dis-
covered the Infantas-La Circa field. Production
increased from 1 million barrels per year in 1925
to 20 million barrels per year in 1928 (Durán);
and by 1949, the De Mares concession (now
owned by Tropical Oil) achieved production in
1,297 out of 1,373 wells drilled, or approximately
77 percent of the total country’s oil production
at that time. As the 30-year reversion date of the
De Mares concession neared, the Colombian gov-
ernment needed an organization to take over the
expiring concession. On January 9, 1951 (Bell,
p. 116), Ecopetrol was born to foster a smooth
transition.
1951–1974
The creation of Ecopetrol came at a deli-
cate time for both the oil sector and Colom-
bia. Just three years earlier, the country entered
a bloody civil war—La Violencia—that drove
away foreign direct investment as soon as the
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military junta took power beginning in 1957.
Afraid of increasing social unrest, the govern-
ment mandated that Ecopetrol subsidize fuel
price increases created through exchange rate
fluctuations and exploited Ecopetrol’s position
as a government organization to freely use its
profits. Within the oil sector, Ecopetrol’s iden-
tity crisis intensified. From 1951 to 1955, the
role of Ecopetrol was primarily administrative
and regulatory, as it served to oversee current
concession contracts and to take over expiring
concessions. 
After the reversion of the first contracts,
Ecopetrol began to expand its role in the oil sec-
tor. Initially, Ecopetrol generated profits
through royalty collections and the operation of
generally less profitable downstream activities
like refining and distilling. The company oper-
ated three key refineries: the Barrancabermeja
refinery; the Reficar refinery (the only northern
refinery, in Cartagena); and the Orito refinery,
which it established in 1972 (Argáez and Parra).
Over time, foreign companies often consulted
Ecopetrol for technical advice and in exchange
provided Ecopetrol the option to partner in pro-
duction. By 1974, however, Ecopetrol wanted
more than just the option to enter into pro-
duction contracts.
Oil exports had fallen from 15 percent in
1966 to zero percent in 1973 (García and Lla-
mas, p. 18), as oil production could not keep
pace with the rate at which the country was
depleting its reserves. Colombia’s precarious
position as an oil importer coincided with the
1973 oil shock that sent oil prices skyrocketing.
Ecopetrol’s commitment to subsidize the price
of oil in Colombia after La Violencia became
incredibly expensive. The year 1974 also marked
the end of the National Front government
that had been in place since the end of La Vio-
lencia in 1957. The new government aimed to
increase domestic oil production to make
Colombia a net oil exporter, in turn increasing
royalties and reducing Ecopetrol’s losses from
oil price subsidies. 
1974–2003: The Association
Contract System
The political and economic situation in
1974 gave the Colombian government tremen-
dous leverage in establishing Ecopetrol as the
national oil company. In addition to collecting
royalties, Ecopetrol retained exclusive oil explo-
ration and exploitation rights in Colombia
(Echeverry et al., p. 3), forcing international com-
panies to form a joint venture with Ecopetrol. 
Under the terms of the association con-
tract system, from 1974 to 1989, a contract con-
tained two phases: exploration and exploitation.
The first phase lasted six years, and 100 percent
of the costs of exploration were paid for by the
foreign company interested in Colombian oil. If
a commercial discovery was made, the company
paid 20 percent in royalties to Ecopetrol based
on oil produced. At the point of commercial dis-
covery—initiating the exploitation phase—
Ecopetrol would also assume 50 percent of
the well production and 50 percent of further
investments made in the well for an additional
period of 22 years. Ecopetrol would not take part
in production until 50 percent of the exploration
costs had been covered (Echeverry, p. 5). 
The terms of the new contract were
undoubtedly less favorable for foreign specula-
tors who now bore all of the exploration risk
while essentially splitting their profits with
Ecopetrol. By 1980, production fell to 131,000
bpd under the association contract system com-
pared to 226,000 bpd in 1970 under the for-
mer concession contract system (Echeverry et
al., p. 7). The discovery of 1,100 million bar-
rels of oil in the Caño Limón field in 1983 by
Occidental (Argáez and Parra) not only doubled
Colombia’s proved reserves but also created false
hope oil could still be profitable under the
new contract terms. It is not a coincidence
that the average number of association con-
tracts per year increased from 9, from 1970 to
1982, to 21, from 1983 to 1989—beginning in
the year Caño Limón was discovered (Echeverry
et al., p. 15). 
As foreign interest increased after the Caño
Limón discovery, Ecopetrol again sought to
change the terms of the association contract.
The Colombian constitution signed in 1991
mandated greater royalty payments to local
regions from which oil was being extracted. Fur-
thermore, depressed oil prices throughout the
1980s made these payments more difficult and
prevented the oil industry from taking advan-
tage of foreign interest in Colombian oil.
The original association contract failed
to take into account the size of the oil well—
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Ecopetrol would assume 50 percent of pro-
duction at the point of commercial discovery
regardless of how much future oil the well
produced. This meant that Ecopetrol effectively
operated half of the well, with the other half
operated by the multinational oil company. The
new Minister of Mines and Energy—Margarita
Mena de Quevedo—introduced the sliding scale
by which Ecopetrol’s production stake increased
5 percentage points for every 30 thousand bar-
rels of oil above 60 thousand per contract begin-
ning in 1990. For smaller wells that produced
less than 60 million barrels, the new sliding
scale had no effect. However, Ecopetrol would
now control 55 percent of production for wells
producing 60 to 90 thousand barrels of oil.
The sliding scale increased up to 70 percent
for contracts with greater than 150 thousand
barrels of production (Echeverry et al., p. 9).
This is known as a Type B contract. 
The signing of the present-day Colombian
constitution in 1991 marked the beginning of a
production boom for the oil industry. Wells at
Caño Limón (1986) and British Petroleum–
operated Cusiana (1992) helped propel Colom-
bian production to a high of 838,000 bpd in
1999 and increased reserves to 1,359 million
barrels in 1998 (Segovia, pp. 8–9). The associ-
ation contract terms were changed to reflect the
spike in production. Ecopetrol still sought to
joint venture with foreign firms under the
sliding scale concept, but Ecopetrol’s percent
participation would now be determined by the
well’s profitability taking into account total
investment and current oil prices. Under the
new Type C contract, profitability would be
determined using an “R-factor.” The R-factor
is computed using a formula that considers
inputs, such as accumulated investment, total
revenues, exploration costs, and costs refunded
by the government, once commercial discovery
had been established (Argáez and Parra). For the
greater part of the 1990s, it appeared that the
oil sector was booming. 
The Oil Landscape Preceding 2003
and Impetus for Change
By the year 2003, oil production had fallen
to 541,000 bpd from 687,000 bpd just three years
earlier (UN Comtrade). How could the indus-
try reach a historical production high in 1999
and call for change just four years later? History
suggests that the fall in production could be
explained by the introduction of the Type D con-
tract in 2000. Under this contract, for the first
time the new contract terms were actually more
favorable for foreign companies. Royalties were
no longer fixed at 20 percent; instead, they
increased on a straight-line basis beginning at
5 percent based on production (Rojas, p. 259).
Contract terms were extended to 30 years and
the R-factor determined on a field-by-field
basis instead of on a per-contract basis, which
was previously used. All of this made smaller
wells more profitable than ever. Moreover,
Ecopetrol’s stake in each contract was reduced
to 30 percent for most wells (Rojas, p. 266). 
Three factors were particularly detrimen-
tal to Colombian oil production during this
period: government liabilities, Colombian para-
military attacks, and oil profitability. The sign-
ing of the constitution in 1991 created new
liabilities for the government. Government pen-
sions were now the responsibility of the cen-
tral government and not local institutions as
was previously commonplace. Education and
healthcare initiatives were also subsidized, all
of which increased the public debt to 35 percent
of GDP in 1998 (World Bank). 
The debt problem was compounded by
irresponsible spending of rising oil royalties. The
Colombian government deficit was at its high-
est at any point during the twentieth century in
2000, despite oil taxes and royalties paid to
the government of $1.4 billion in the same year.
This marked a substantial increase from 1995
in which oil sector revenues were just $747 mil-
lion (Tordo et al., p. 6). The government sim-
ply had access to finances unlike ever before.
This deficit had a direct impact on oil: How
could the Colombian government afford to
finance its postdiscovery oil field participation
(30 percent) when it could not currently sat-
isfy its current debt obligation for defense and
social programs? 
The paramilitary groups, Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and Ejército
de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation
Army), used their control of the isolated geog-
raphy of Colombia to extort money from the
oil companies by kidnapping employees and
bombing the pipelines. The cost of these attacks,
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including construction and the opportunity cost
of lost oil transport, is estimated at $141.2
million (Pearce, p. 10).
After the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2011, the price of one barrel of oil plummeted
below $20 and had only recovered to $30 by
2003, cutting into the profit margin on each bar-
rel. The density of oil is measured by the Amer-
ican Petroleum Institute (API) based on its
density relative to water. An API below 10 clas-
sifies the heaviest crude and indicates that the
oil is denser than water. Oil with an API greater
than 10 is considered light and floats on top of
oil. Higher-density oil is thicker, significantly
more expensive to extract, and less valuable to
refineries. Most of Colombian oil has an API
between 22.3 and 31.1 and is classified as
medium oil. Although more profitable than
heavy crude, it is not as profitable as the light
crude abundant in Iraq and Iran. If the market
price of oil falls far enough, the high cost to
extract heavy oil makes its extraction simply not
profitable for oil companies. Decreasing margins
driven by depressed oil prices are another rea-
son why foreign direct investment in Colombian
oil fell to $300 million in 2003 (World Bank). 
By 2003, it was clear a change was needed;
the increased risk of investing in Colombian oil
that came as a result of political instability
and highly levered government debt was simply
not worth the return. More importantly, it
became clear that the government fiscal crisis
was spilling into an oil industry that was com-
peting for funds from the national budget.
Ecopetrol was created purely as a regulator but,
as a national oil company, it also became finan-
cially liable for the national deficit. Further-
more, through 2007 Ecopetrol had lost an
estimated $10 billion annually by providing fuel
price subsidies to consumers in Colombia
(World Bank). This relationship further dimin-
ished investor confidence—there were seven
exploration contracts signed in 2002 com-
pared to 28 in 2001 and 32 in 2000 (Echeverry
et al., p. 15).
The Modern Colombian Oil Era:
Exploration and Production
Contracts
Decree 1760 of 2003 marked the beginning
of the new Colombian oil sector as it operates
today, effectively denationalizing the entire
industry. The decree created an oil industry reg-
ulator, the Agencia Nacional De Hidrocarburos
(ANH) (National Agency of Hydrocarbons),
and split off Ecopetrol into an independent
entity whose majority owner is the Colombian
government. 
Since 2003, oil speculators can own two
contracts: a technical evaluation contract (TEA)
and a modern concession contract (E&P). The
TEA lasts 18 months for onshore contracts
and 24 months for offshore contracts (Cuervo,
p. 5). During this phase, oil companies survey
a block of land for geological properties and drill
exploratory wells to determine oil and economic
potential. The TEA can be converted into an
E&P contract at any time. E&P contracts are
granted through an open bidding process,
although it is not uncommon for firms to nego-
tiate directly with the state. The initial explo-
ration phase of an E&P contract is six years
followed by a flexible two-year evaluation period
in which economic feasibility can be deter-
mined. For heavy oils with an API gravity below
15, the evaluation period can be extended an
additional two years (“Working in Colombia”).
Declaration of commercial discovery at any
point during the initial exploration or evalua-
tion phase is followed by a 24-year production
phase. Each contract contains clauses that allow
the ANH to revoke the contract if the land is not
actively being explored or extracted to ensure
maximum productivity. 
The Colombian government, now fully
independent of Ecopetrol, uses three methods to
maintain financial interest in each contract
signed: royalties, income tax payments, and pay-
ments to the ANH. Royalty payments are based
on a sliding scale, beginning at 8 percent for pro-
duction up to 5,000 bpd and increasing to a max-
imum of 25 percent up to 600,000 bpd (Echev-
erry et al., p. 9) per field. Most fields in Colombia
today have a production capacity range of 55,000
to 75,000 bpd and pay associated royalty rates
between 12 and 15 percent (“Ecopetrol Investor
Presentation . . .”). To address the problem of
expensive heavy oil, hydrocarbons with an API
below 15 are only subject to 75 percent of the
aforementioned royalty payments (Martínez).
Income is subject to the statewide income tax
rate paid by all corporations operating in Colom-
bia. This fixed statutory rate is 33 percent except
53
in years when little or no taxable income is
earned, in which  case tax liability is deter-
mined as 33 percent of 3 percent of the com-
pany’s prior year net tax equity. 
The ANH auctions predetermine onshore
and offshore blocks of territory in several rounds
throughout the calendar year. Oil companies bid
on these blocks by offering percentage holdings
in production to the ANH. In 2010, bids were
received for percentages between 1 and 32
percent (“Las Regalías . . .”). Every 1 percent
contributed to the ANH must be matched with
a 0.7 to 1.1 percent contribution to the state,
further increasing the state take. Using these
three mechanisms, the Colombian government
is able to maintain anywhere from a 40 to 64
percent interest in each modern concession
contract signed (“Las Regalías . . .”). For con-
tracts exclusively signed with Ecopetrol, special
provisions allow the state take to reach 95
percent (“Las Regalías . . .”). Although these
terms seem unfavorable to prospective oil spec-
ulators, until 1999 these same companies were
still paying 20 percent royalties, conceding 50
percent of production to the state, and paying
all exploration costs.
Under the modern E&P contract, oil com-
panies own 100 percent of the reserves beneath
contracted land. Although these companies pay
taxes and royalties, Ecopetrol no longer has any
equity interest in the post-commercial discov-
ery production of these fields for contracts
signed after 2003 (“Working in Colombia”).
All contracts signed before the decree will be
honored until the contract expires unless the
contract included a provision for extension. Due
to the leverage of Ecopetrol under pre-2003 con-
tract terms, most field resources revert back
to Ecopetrol upon expiration of the contract.
For this reason there is little incentive for
Ecopetrol to extend any pre-existing contracts. 
2003–2012: Evaluating the
Success/Failure of the 2003
Legislation
Given the lagged relationship between
oil investment and production, the successes
and failures of the 2003 privatization of the
Colombian oil sector can be assessed from the
following perspectives: the oil sector, Ecopetrol,
and the Colombian government. 
The Oil Sector
In retrospect, the 2003 legislative change
was a significant turning point for the oil indus-
try in Colombia. At present, the 541,000 bpd
in 2003 in oil production seems paltry compared
to the 1.1 million bpd produced by the coun-
try in April of 2013 (“Colombia Exceeds . . .”).
This April 2013 bpd figure represents the high-
est monthly total in history. By opening the
oil sector to essentially free competition, Colom-
bia was able to effectively attract foreign oil
companies who refused to participate in the pre-
viously unfavorable investment climate. Boom-
ing foreign direct investment in the oil and
gas sector is one of the biggest reasons for
this improvement. Foreign direct investment
increased to $2.8 billion in 2010 up from $300
million in 2003 (“Ecopetrol Investor Presenta-
tion,” p. 10). This influx in capital has directly
increased the land area under exploration from
12.5 million hectares in 2003 to 102.0 million
hectares in 2011 (Segovia). Improved oil recov-
ery technology has also increased sector produc-
tion: 11 percent of total production came from
secondary recovery in 2011 (“Ecopetrol Investor
Presentation,” p. 20). From a production and
investment standpoint, the 2003 legislative
change was a major success. 
The renewed success of the oil sector in
Colombia has also prompted transportation
infrastructure expansion. The most significant
of these investments is the Bicentennial
Pipeline, jointly owned by Ecopetrol and Pacific
Rubiales (“Colombia’s New Oil . . .”). The 150-
mile pipeline—with a capacity of 120,000 bpd—
will transport oil from the Llanos Basin in
northeast Colombia. The Bicentennial Pipeline
will then connect to the Caño Limón pipeline
for transport to the shipping hub of Coveñas.
Declining production in the Caño Limón field
has depressed transport of oil in the pipeline
to 70,000 bpd, well below its capacity of 220,000
bpd (“Colombia’s New Oil . . .”). By increasing
transport capacity, the oil sector will be able
to reduce supply chain constraints. 
Although the 2003 regulation successfully
infused necessary capital to grow oil sector
investment and production, the oil sector
remains hostage to paramilitary violence. Most
recently, attacks on oil pipelines increased to 84
in 2011 up from 31 in 2010 (United States
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Energy Information Administration). Ecopetrol
CEO Javier Gutiérrez estimates that 3,000 bpd
were lost in September 2012 due to paramili-
tary attacks (Molinski).
Ecopetrol
Although the 2003 legislation severed
Ecopetrol’s government ties as chief regulator of
the oil industry, Ecopetrol struggled finan-
cially because it remained 100 percent owned by
the struggling Colombian government.
Ecopetrol had to compete with other govern-
ment programs for limited resources, and its
ability to issue debt remained capped by a gov-
ernment already deeply in debt (Tordo et al., 
p. 6). Although Ecopetrol could in theory make
independent investment decisions, it was still
restrained by Colombian government debt that
was 55 percent of GDP in 2003 (World Bank).
Law 1118 signed in 2006 authorized the sale of
a 20 percent equity ownership of Ecopetrol
through an initial public offering (IPO) that took
place in September 2007 (Walsh), with the other
80 percent remaining under state ownership.
The IPO raised $2.8 billion and for the first
time allowed Ecopetrol to “define its own invest-
ments and release itself from fiscal accounts and
the system of State” (Benavides). By selling stock
first to the Colombian people, the government
empowered the people to take ownership of oil
production in the country. The government also
wanted to encourage the Colombian people to
support Ecopetrol because today most Colom-
bians are customers, employees, or sharehold-
ers. Today, Ecopetrol trades on stock exchanges
in Colombia (Bolsa de Valores de Colombia
[BVC]), the United States (New York Stock
Exchange [NYSE]), Peru (Bolsa de Valores de
Lima [BVL]), and Canada (Toronto Stock
Exchange [TSX]). As of April 30, 2013,
Ecopetrol’s market capitalization of $98.25 bil-
lion makes it one of the 50 largest oil companies
in the world and the fourth largest oil com-
pany in Latin America. Only 9.9 percent of the
authorized 20.1 percent ownership stake has
been issued (“Ecopetrol Investor Presentation”),
providing an opportunity for further expansion
of capital through stock sales. To put this into
perspective, Ecopetrol’s market capitalization
briefly passed Brazilian oil conglomerate Petro-
bras in May 2012 (Crooks et al.). 
Today Ecopetrol appears to have gained
the most since the introduction of the E&P con-
tract in 2003. Capital obtained through refi-
nancing (discussed previously) allowed
Ecopetrol to increase capital expenditures from
$617 million in 2004 to $3 billion in 2008
after the stock sale (Tordo et al., p. 6). This
increasing trend has continued to the present
day: Ecopetrol estimates capital expenditures to
be $8.5 billion in 2011, a 386 percent increase
since 2007 (“Ecopetrol Investor Presentation”).
These investments have increased the com-
pany’s direct market share of exploration lands
in Colombia to 40 percent as of September 2011
and have allowed Ecopetrol to sign E&P con-
tracts in the United States, Peru, and Brazil
(“Ecopetrol Investor Presentation”). 
This financial flexibility has also dra-
matically increased production capacity for
Ecopetrol. Ecopetrol has retained close to 80
percent of total oil production, primarily
through preexisting association contracts
(Segovia, p. 5). In August of 2012, only 113,000
bpd of 918,000 bpd produced by the country
(12.3 percent) came from contracts signed
after 2003. This figure will surely decline as the
old association contracts expire, yet it remains
a testament to the market presence of
Ecopetrol. 
Another area where Ecopetrol has bene-
fited is in refining. Ecopetrol currently owns
100 percent of the 290,850 bpd in refining
capacity spread across five refineries through-
out Colombia (United States Energy Informa-
tion Administration). In April 2012, Ecopetrol
invested $3.8 billion to increase capacity at
its Cartagena refinery from 80,000 bpd to
220,000 bpd. Ecopetrol also hopes to increase
capacity at the Barrancabermeja refinery to
300,000 bpd. In total, refining capacity will
increase by 215,000 bpd as a result of these
improvements (United States Energy Infor-
mation Administration). While refining is a
downstream oil activity considered by many the
least profitable segment of the supply chain,
Ecopetrol stands to profit from its current
monopoly on refining. 
The Colombian Government
Finally, the Colombian government ben-
efited from the 2003 restructuring from a fiscal
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policy perspective. Royalties collected by the
government from the oil and mining industry
increased 70 percent from 2006 to 201l
(Embassy of Colombia). As an 80 percent major-
ity shareholder, the government also stands to
profit from its ownership of Ecopetrol while
keeping national financial independence. This
influx of revenue has allowed the government
to revise the distribution of royalties to local
governments. In addition to providing subsidies
to all regions—oil producing or not—the cen-
tral government hopes to reduce local corrup-
tion by replacing paramilitary bribes with legit-
imate government financing. In 2005, Congress
approved Law 963—better known as the Stabil-
ity Law—which honors the terms of a foreign
investment contract regardless of subsequent
legislation passed. This law, in conjunction with
the creation of the ANH, has dramatically
increased investor confidence. The ANH is
currently auctioning off 109 blocks for E&P, the
most in history. 
The Future of the Colombian Oil
Industry and the Economy
Just 10 years ago, the oil sector in Colom-
bia was on the brink of collapse. That produc-
tion has doubled since then is a testament to the
success of the 2003 legislation. As the sector
pushes beyond the 1,000,000 bpd production
goal, it is important to highlight the opportuni-
ties and threats facing the industry, beginning
with the neutralization of the FARC. 
The Colombian government has tried to
appease FARC demands for decades in hopes
of a peace agreement, yet oil pipeline attacks
persist. Two attacks in February 2013 prevented
the transportation of more than 100,000 barrels
of oil and reasserted the FARC’s presence in
the country (“Colombia Oil Pipeline . . .”).
Ecopetrol’s net income for 2012 fell 4.4 percent
from 2011—a loss that CEO Javier Gutiérrez
attributed to rising operational costs from infra-
structure repair and depressed oil prices
(“Colombia’s Oil Company . . .”). The instability
created by the FARC is a major reason why
Colombia lost its investment grade status from
Moody’s for 11 years before it was upgraded in
2011 to Baa3. Despite the upgrade, Colombia’s
rating is the lowest investment grade rating and
increases the cost of debt for both the Colom-
bian government and Colombian oil companies
relative to countries with higher credit rat-
ings.
The Asian market provides an intriguing
opportunity for Colombian oil. On May 9, 2012,
Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos
reached an agreement with the state-operated
China Development Bank that would create
an $8 billion oil pipeline that runs to Colombia’s
Pacific coast from the Llanos Basin (Hall).
Although most experts anticipate the pipeline
will not be completed until 2016 at the earli-
est, the pipeline is the first step toward increas-
ing Asian exports. Approximately 60 percent
of Colombia’s oil exports were sent to the United
States Gulf Coast compared to only 27 percent
that were sent to the Far East in the first half
of 2011 (Walsh). The proposed pipeline will
transport both Venezuelan and Colombian oil—
an ancillary benefit to two historically incom-
patible nations. For Colombia the math is sim-
ple: China imported 5.69 million bpd of oil in
the first quarter of 2012 and only 56,000 bpd
came from Colombia (Hall), which achieved just
under one million bpd of production in the same
period. 
Despite the tremendous growth of the oil
sector, any country that becomes too heavily
reliant on a single export becomes subject to
Dutch disease. Named after the economic
crisis in the Netherlands in the 1960s, Dutch
disease occurs when a single commodity, or 
a heavy inflow of foreign direct investment,
drives a significant percentage of the economy.
Tremendous inflow of foreign capital in one
sector of the economy increases the value of
the local currency. A spike in currency valua-
tion weighs heavily on other areas of the econ-
omy that are not experiencing the same rapid
growth and makes other local goods rela-
tively more expensive for foreign countries 
to purchase, symptoms already seen in Colom-
bia. In 2005, petroleum accounted for only
37 percent of total Colombian exports—a fig-
ure that has since surged to 62 percent in 2012
(UN Comtrade). Furthermore, the Colombian
peso appreciated in value by 9 percent against
the U.S. dollar year to date in March 2012
(Montealegre). This currency appreciation 
is a direct result of disproportionately large 
oil exports and a tremendous influx of for-
eign direct investment in extractive industries
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that approximated $15 billion in 2012 (Dolan),
or 85 percent of total foreign direct invest-
ment. The dominance of oil in the Colom-
bian economy has already infected other sec-
tors. Coffee and banana exports are at
historically low levels. Colombian economist
Carlos Gustavo Cano estimates that “the 
value of goods [from] mining and energy 
contribute[s] more than four-fifths of exports
. . . though only generat[ing] 200,000 
direct jobs” (“Cano: . . . ”). As the peso con-
tinues to appreciate, wealth is distributed only
to a small percentage of Colombians while
the cost of living rises significantly for the rest
of the country. Resolving this issue could 
prove even more difficult. Although mone-
tary policy can help devalue the Colombian
peso, thereby appeasing local exporters in
other industries, devaluing the currency will
also raise prices in all areas for Colombian 
consumers.
Conclusion
Twentieth-century oil policy in Colombia
largely resembled a sinking ship. As the govern-
ment vainly tried to introduce new contracts to
plug the proverbial leak, new problems arose. It
was not until 2003 that policy makers finally
realized that they needed a new ship—the dena-
tionalization of the oil industry. The oil indus-
try has since benefited tremendously from an
influx of foreign capital and a capitalist business
environment. Ecopetrol was finally freed from
government debt and was well positioned to
dominate the new market. The Colombian
government stands to benefit as the majority
owner of Ecopetrol and can now divert
resources once meant for oil to other govern-
ment initiatives. Having learned from its mis-
takes, the Colombian oil sector must take advan-
tage of its current position to become a
legitimate player in the global oil economy. 
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